Security Monitoring Challenges in the SOC
Analysts in the security operations center (SOC) try to have complete visibility into what’s happening in a network. However, that task is easier said than done. There are several challenges that can lead to false negatives (where you cannot detect malicious or abnormal activity in the network and systems). The following sections highlight some of these challenges.
Security Monitoring and Encryption
Encryption has great benefits for security and privacy, but the world of incident response and forensics can present several challenges. Even law enforcement agencies have been fascinated with the dual-use nature of encryption. When protecting information and communications, encryption has numerous benefits for everyone from governments and militaries to corporations and individuals.
On the other hand, those same mechanisms can be used by threat actors as a method of evasion and obfuscation. Historically, even governments have tried to regulate the use and exportation of encryption technologies. A good example is the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is a multinational agreement with the goal of regulating the export of technologies like encryption.
Other examples include events around law enforcement agencies such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) trying to force vendors to leave certain investigative techniques in their software and devices. Some folks have bought into the idea of “encrypt everything.” However, encrypting everything would have very serious consequences, not only for law enforcement agencies, but also for incident response professionals. Something to remember about the concept of “encrypt everything” is that the deployment of end-to-end encryption is difficult and can leave unencrypted data at risk of attack.
Many security products (including next-generation IPSs and next-generation firewalls) can intercept, decrypt, inspect, and re-encrypt or even ignore encrypted traffic payloads. Some people consider this a man-in-the-middle (MITM) matter and have many privacy concerns. On the other hand, you can still use metadata from network traffic and other security event sources to investigate and solve security issues. You can obtain a lot of good information by leveraging NetFlow, firewall logs, web proxy logs, user authentication information, and even passive DNS (pDNS) data. In some cases, the combination of these logs can make the encrypted contents of malware payloads and other traffic irrelevant. Of course, this is as long as you can detect their traffic patterns to be able to remediate an incident.
It is a fact that you need to deal with encrypted data, whether in transit or “at rest” on an endpoint or server. If you deploy web proxies, you’ll need to assess the feasibility in your environment of MITM secure HTTP connections.
Security Monitoring and Network Address Translation
In Chapter 10, “Network Infrastructure Device Telemetry and Analysis,” you learned that Layer 3 devices, such as routers and firewalls, can perform Network Address Translation (NAT). The router or firewall “translates” the “internal” host’s private (or real) IP addresses to a publicly routable (or mapped) address. By using NAT, the firewall hides the internal private addresses from the unprotected network and exposes only its own address or public range. This enables a network professional to use any IP address space as the internal network. A best practice is to use the address spaces that are reserved for private use (see RFC 1918, “Address Allocation for Private Internets”).
Static NAT allows connections to be initiated bidirectionally, meaning both to the host and from the host.
NAT can present a challenge when you’re performing security monitoring and analyzing logs, NetFlow, and other data, because device IP addresses can be seen in the logs as the “translated” IP address versus the “real” IP address. In the case of Port Address Translation (PAT), this could become even more problematic because many different hosts can be translated to a single address, making the correlation almost impossible to achieve.
Security products, such as the Cisco Stealthwatch system, provide features that can be used to correlate and “map” translated IP addresses with NetFlow. This feature in the Cisco Stealthwatch system is called NAT stitching. This accelerates incident response tasks and eases continuous security monitoring operations.
Security Monitoring and Event Correlation Time Synchronization
Server and endpoint logs, NetFlow, syslog data, and any other security monitoring data are useless if they show the wrong date and time. This is why as a best practice you should configure all network devices to use Network Time Protocol (NTP). Using NTP ensures that the correct time is set and all devices within the network are synchronized. Also, another best practice is to try to reduce the number of duplicate logs. This is why you have to think and plan ahead as to where exactly you will deploy NetFlow, how you will correlate it with other events (like syslog), and so on.
DNS Tunneling and Other Exfiltration Methods
Threat actors have been using many different nontraditional techniques to steal data from corporate networks without being detected. For example, they have been sending stolen credit card data, intellectual property, and confidential documents over DNS using tunneling. As you probably know, DNS is a protocol that enables systems to resolve domain names (for example, cisco.com) into IP addresses (for example, 184.108.40.206). DNS is not intended for a command channel or even tunneling. However, attackers have developed software that enables tunneling over DNS. These threat actors like to use protocols that traditionally are not designed for data transfer because they are less inspected in terms of security monitoring. Undetected DNS tunneling (otherwise known as DNS exfiltration) represents a significant risk to any organization.
In many cases, malware can use Base64 encoding to put sensitive data (such as credit card numbers, personal identifiable information [PII], and so on) in the payload of DNS packets to cyber criminals. The following are some examples of encoding methods that could be used by attackers:
▪ Base64 encoding
▪ Binary (8-bit) encoding
▪ NetBIOS encoding
▪ Hex encoding
Several utilities have been created to perform DNS tunneling (for the good and also for the bad). The following are a few examples:
▪ DeNiSe: This Python tool is used for tunneling TCP over DNS.
▪ dns2tcp: Written by Olivier Dembour and Nicolas Collignon in C, this tool supports KEY and TXT request types.
▪ DNScapy: Created by Pierre Bienaimé, this Python-based Scapy tool for packet generation even supports SSH tunneling over DNS, including a SOCKS proxy.
▪ DNScat or DNScat-P: This Java-based tool created by Tadeusz Pietraszek supports bidirectional communication through DNS.
▪ DNScat (DNScat-B): Written by Ron Bowes, this tool runs on Linux, Mac OS X, and Windows. DNScat encodes DNS requests in NetBIOS encoding or hex encoding.
▪ Heyoka: This tool, written in C, supports bidirectional tunneling for data exfiltration.
▪ Iodine: Written by Bjorn Andersson and Erik Ekman in C, this tool runs on Linux, Mac OS X, and Windows, and can even be ported to Android.
▪ Nameserver Transfer Protocol (NSTX): This tool creates IP tunnels using DNS.
▪ OzymanDNS: Written in Perl by Dan Kaminsky, this tool is used to set up an SSH tunnel over DNS or for file transfer. The requests are Base32 encoded, and responses are Base64-encoded TXT records.
▪ psudp: Developed by Kenton Born, this tool injects data into existing DNS requests by modifying the IP/UDP lengths.
▪ Feederbot and Moto: Attackers have used this malware using DNS to steal sensitive information from many organizations.
Some of these tools were not created with the intent of stealing data, but cyber criminals have used them for their own purposes.
The examples in Figure 12-2 and Figure 12-3 demonstrate how DNS tunneling can be achieved with the Iodine tool. Figure 12-2 shows the Iodine server listening for any connections from clients using DNS resolution for the domain h4cker.org.
Figure 12-3 shows the Iodine client (assume that this is a compromised system). The client successfully established a connection to the Iodine server. The 192.168.88.207 IP address is the address configured in the network interface card (NIC) of the server. The 10.1.1.1 is the IP address used by Iodine to communicate with the clients over the tunnel. In this example, the client IP address is 10.1.1.2, and the server tunnel IP address is 10.1.1.1. All data is now sent over the DNS tunnel, and the domain h4cker.org is used for DNS resolution.
Security Monitoring and Tor
Many people use tools such as Tor for privacy. Tor is a free tool that enables its users to surf the web anonymously. Tor works by routing IP traffic through a free, worldwide network consisting of thousands of Tor relays. Then it constantly changes the way it routes traffic to obscure a user’s location from anyone monitoring the network.
The use of Tor also makes security monitoring and incident response more difficult because it’s hard to attribute and trace back the traffic to the user. Different types of malware are known to use Tor to cover their tracks.
This “onion routing” is accomplished by encrypting the application layer of a communication protocol stack that’s nested just like the layers of an onion. The Tor client encrypts the data multiple times and sends it through a network or circuit that includes randomly selected Tor relays. Each of the relays decrypts a layer of the onion to reveal only the next relay so that the remaining encrypted data can be routed on to it.
Figure 12-4 shows the Tor browser. You can see the Tor circuit when the user accessed h4cker.org from the Tor browser. The packets first went to a host in the Netherlands, then to hosts in Norway and Germany, and finally to h4cker.org.
A Tor exit node is basically the last Tor node or the gateway where the Tor encrypted traffic exits to the Internet. A Tor exit node can be targeted to monitor Tor traffic. Many organizations block Tor exit nodes in their environment. The Tor project has a dynamic list of Tor exit nodes that makes this task a bit easier. This Tor exit node list can be downloaded from https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses.
Security Monitoring and Peer-to-Peer Communication
Peer-to-peer (P2P) communication involves a distributed architecture that divides tasks between participant computing peers. In a P2P network, the peers are equally privileged, which is why it’s called a peer-to-peer network of nodes.
P2P participant computers or nodes reserve a chunk of their resources (such as CPU, memory, disk storage, and network bandwidth) so that other peers or participants can access those resources. This is all done without the need of a centralized server. In P2P networks, each peer can be both a supplier as well as a consumer of resources or data. A good example was the music-sharing application Napster back in the 1990s.
P2P networks have been used to share music, videos, stolen books, and other data; even legitimate multimedia applications such as Spotify use a peer-to-peer network along with streaming servers to stream audio and video to their clients. There’s even an application called Peercoin (also known as PPCoin) that’s a P2P crypto currency that utilizes both proof-of-stake and proof-of-work systems.
Universities such as MIT and Penn State have even created a project called LionShare, which is designed to share files among educational institutions globally.
From a security perspective, P2P systems introduce unique challenges. Malware has used P2P networks to communicate and also spread to victims. Many “free” or stolen music and movie files usually come with the surprise of malware. Additionally, like any other form of software, P2P applications are not immune to security vulnerabilities. This, of course, introduces risks for P2P software because it is more susceptible to remote exploits, due to the nature of the P2P network architecture.